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Michele Ford 
Introduction 
Indonesia has a long history of violent industrial conflict involving rioting and wide-scale 
destruction of property, in addition – and sometimes as an alternative – to more orthodox 
strike actions. Violent actions taken by wage labourers on the plantations as a form of protest 
against their employers were recorded in the archipelago since the nineteenth century (Stoler 
1985, 1995). Episodes of violent industrial protest continued through the twentieth century, 
but were particularly common in industrial areas in the late 1980s and 1990s, at a time when 
independent labour organizing was forbidden under the punitive labour relations regime 
implemented by Suharto’s authoritarian New Order (1967-1998). Despite dramatic changes 
to the industrial relations system, including significant improvements in collective bargaining 
structures and in workers’ access to the freedom to organize, industrial violence continues to 
have a place in the repertoires of action of waged labour in contemporary Indonesia. 
Many Indonesian authority figures, and some anthropologists, have described episodes of 
sudden and unexpected violent protest in cultural terms, drawing on concepts such as to run 
amok (mengamuk) and spirit possession (kesurupan). But, as the discussion that follows 
shows, while cultural (and historical) patterns may have a role in determining the contours of 
contemporary incidences of violent industrial protest, they clearly have roots in economic 
structure and the disjunctures between the rhetoric and practice of industrial relations. In the 
first part of the chapter, the cultural and structural arguments about violent industrial protest 
in Indonesia are mapped out with reference to major incidents of industrial violence in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the second part, the chapter provides a detailed description of two very 
different large-scale incidents of industrial violence in the Batam free trade zone, the first 
apparently a culturally-motivated protest, the second clearly linked to an industrial dispute 
over the wage determination process, before going on to demonstrate that these incidents 
actually have a great deal in common. The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite 
dramatic changes in the industrial relations landscape since the fall of Suharto’s New Order 
regime in 1998, violent protests are likely to continue to occur as long as more ‘modern’ 
alternatives (like lawful strikes and collective bargaining) are perceived to be ineffective.1 
Cultural and structural explanations of violent industrial protest in Indonesia 
The question of collective violence, both communal and economic, has long fascinated 
Indonesians and scholars of Indonesia, not least because of the apparent incongruity of 
sudden outbursts of violent protest in cultures – most notably that of the majority Javanese – 
that place a high value on harmony and restraint in the expression of emotion. Some 
observers have found recourse in cultural explanations of this phenomenon.2 According to 
Prabowo Subianto, the son-in-law of President Suharto and one-time commander of 
Indonesia’s controversial Special Forces: ‘Indonesians can very quickly turn to violence. The 
word “amok” comes from the lingua franca of this archipelago. This is something that we are 
aware of, something we do not like, and something that we would like to address, to control 
and to manage’ (cited in Collins 2002: 582). Prabowo was speaking at a time of great 
violence, much of it communal. Suharto’s New Order – which had seized power ostensibly to 
foil a coup attempt by communists during which six generals were murdered and, in 
retaliation for those murders, massacred hundreds of thousands of leftists (Cribb 1990, 
Kammen and McGregor 2012; Roosa 2006) – had itself fallen amid violent protest in the 
wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. In the early months of the post-Suharto 
period, anti-Chinese violence rocked the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, as well as a number of 
other major cities. Several regions across the country subsequently fell victim to widespread 
inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflict, and the iron fist of state and military control over rent-
seeking from businesses was replaced by privatized rackets run by preman (gangsters).3 
Research suggests that communal conflict was responsible for the greatest number of deaths 
as a result of collective violence, not just in the immediate aftermath of regime change but 
over a much longer period of time. However, communal conflict accounted for little over one 
sixth of the 3608 incidents of collective violence identified by Varshney et al. (2008) in 
Indonesia’s fourteen most violence-affected provinces over the fourteen years between 1990 
and 2003. As Table 1 shows, the category ‘economic collective violence’, accounted for 
nearly as many incidents, although a much smaller percentage of deaths. While this category 
is not limited to industrial incidents, industrial violence is clearly an important element within 
it. Significantly, a vast majority (362 out of a total 444) of the incidents of economic violence 
identified by Varshney and his colleagues occurred in Java, the most populous – but also the 
most industrialized – of Indonesia’s islands, where they accounted for 15.6% of all incidents 
of collective violence between 1990 and 2003. 
Many incidences of industrial violence are spontaneous. However, in a detailed study of 
labour strikes in the 1980s and 1990s, Kammen (1997) identified a significant number of 
instances in which workers threatened to use, or escalate, violence during an industrial 
dispute – something which, he argues, was far more common than the actual use of violence.4 
Similarly, Tjandraningsih (1995: 54) described cases in which women garment workers 
expressed displeasure with their supervisors not only by failing to follow orders, but with 
abusive languages and anonymous letters threatening bodily harm. Kammen’s analysis 
indicated most occurrences of industrial violence involved symbolic acts rather than serious 
attacks on people or property.5 When personal attacks did occur, they were most likely to 
take place when workers had been taunted by a manager or a member of the security forces 
(Kammen 1997: 334).6 
Table 1: Collective violence in fourteen Indonesian provinces, 1990-2003 
Category Incidents Percentage Deaths Percentage 
Ethno-communal 599 16.6 9,612 89.3 
State-community 423 11.7 105 1.0 
Economic 444 12.3 78 0.7 
Other 2,142 59.4 963 9.0 
Total 3,608 100.00 10,758 100.00 
Source: Varshney et al. (2008: 379). 
 
In explaining these attacks, it was not uncommon – as Prabowo’s musings attest – for 
journalists, employers, government officials and military officers to draw upon cultural 
explanations for outbursts of violence. Kammen (1997: 255-257, 319) documents the use of a 
number of such cultural constructs within Indonesian authorities’ explanations for the strike 
wave of the 1980s and 1990s. Among these were a 1989 case where workers at a South 
Korean ceramic toy factory as one of many where workers were reported as having ‘run 
amok’ (mengamuk); a 1992 case when a local district military commander in Tangerang 
criticized the strikers for having a ‘floating mentality’ (mental ngambang) because they had 
not yet fully transitioned from an agricultural to an industrial mode of production; and a 
labour department official in East Java who described a series of strikes in 1991 as a mass 
outbreak of latah, a condition common among older women, in which individuals experience 
sudden, uncontrollable seizures, repeating foul words as if in a trance. 
These assertions echo culturalist explanations employed by some scholarly observers to help 
explain elements of the Indonesian industrial relations system (Hess 1997) or specific aspects 
of the waged labour relationship, notably hysterical outbursts on the part of first-generation 
female industrial workers in the Malay world. Perhaps most famously, Ong (1987: 7-8, 220) 
claimed that the mass spirit possessions (kesurupan) that occurred in factories in 
neighbouring Malaysia were a form of resistance to the social dislocation caused by the 
women’s experiences of capitalist production: 
Spirit possession episodes, in which women become violent and scream abuses, 
are to be deciphered not so much as a noncapitalist critique of abstract exchange 
values … but as a protest against the loss of autonomy/humanity at work … Spirit 
attacks were indirect retaliations against coercion and demands for justice in 
personal terms within the industrial milieu.7 
A second kind of culturalist argument, which sits beside accounts of these psycho-social 
responses to the proletarian condition – but is perhaps more legible to scholars of Western 
labour history – is the claim that Indonesian workers are particularly easily manipulated by 
‘third parties’ (pihak ketiga). Invocations of the threat of Communism were used by 
government and military officials throughout the New Order period to justify tight control 
over the industrial relations system and to discourage independent labour activism.8 
However, they became most vociferous immediately after incidents of large-scale or violent 
industrial action initiated by groups within the ‘alternative’ labour movement. The largest 
incident of collective industrial violence in contemporary Indonesia was the Medan riots of 
April 1994. Following strikes involving tens of thousands of workers, around 20,000 workers 
from 23 factories marched on the Provincial Legislative Council on 13 April to demand a 
resolution to the matters in dispute. Joined by workers from 19 other factories on the 
following day, they marched to the office of the Governor while a second group of workers 
waited to hear a promised address by the Minister for Manpower and the Governor. When the 
Governor did not materialize, workers began attacking passing cars and motorcycles and 
ransacking shops (Hess 1997). The protest quickly descended into ten days of wide-scale 
destruction and anti-Chinese violence, after which Muchtar Pakpahan, the head of the 
Indonesian Prosperous Labour Union (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, SBSI) – one of 
three ‘alternative’ (unregistered) trade unions that emerged in the 1990s – was arrested on 
charges of inciting the violence and subsequently imprisoned, serving a number of months of 
his sentence before being released in response to intense pressure from the US and elsewhere. 
References to the role of ‘outside’ labour activists dominated official statements in the wake 
of the Medan riots.9 In many of these, labour activists were likened to communists or drew 
parallels between the destruction and unrest in Medan and methods used by the Indonesian 
Communist Party. The Minister for Defence and Security, General Edi Sudrajat, commented: 
‘Many people were brought together at the same time in the same place, then filled with 
demands for wage rises, then mobilized. That’s the Indonesian Communist Party way’ 
(Kompas 29 April 1994). Major-General Pranowo was reported to have said that the Medan 
riots proved the workers’ movement to be no longer ‘pure’ because ‘outside forces’ with 
‘certain purposes and objectives’ had been involved (Republika 19 April 1994). According to 
General Feisal Tanjung, ‘The people behind that demonstration were born into ex-
Communist Party families’ (Barata Week 1 May 1994). These accusations were used to shift 
attention from the initial demands of the strikers and in justification for the decisive action 
taken against unionists and labour NGO activists in the wake of the riots. 
Another massive and violent strike, which prompted similar assertions about the involvement 
of ‘outsiders’, occurred in the following year in West Java, when between 7,000 and 12,000 
workers employed at Great River Industries garment manufacturer went on strike to demand 
the minimum wage. When the workers marched on the local parliament building, they were 
met by riot police, who failed to stop them from forcing their way into the grounds of the 
parliament and ultimately into the building. Several protesters were badly injured and a 
number arrested, including Dita Sari, a former student activist and the leader of the 
Indonesian Centre for Labour Struggle (Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, PPBI). Like 
Pakpahan before her, Sari was subsequently charged with inciting the violence. 
It was clear that PPBI, the most radical of the three ‘alternative’ unions of the New Order 
period, played a pivotal role in the protest against Great River Industries and in another round 
of strikes in Surabaya in the following year, during which dozens of workers were injured. 
However, officials again emphasized the role of outsiders in such a way as to discredit the 
strikers and to shift attention from their demands. Significantly, in this case, public statements 
by officials also emphasized the inability of workers to resist incitement by ‘non-workers’ 
who came from ‘outside the factory environment’. For example, the then Commander of East 
Java’s Brawijaya Division, Major-General Imam Utomo, condemned the outsiders, saying 
that ‘thousands of workers who just want to do their work properly were forced to 
demonstrate or strike’. He went on to announce that the armed forces were planning to hold 
‘dialogues’ with the workers to spread the message that workers should resist being 
‘influenced by talk from outside’ (Surya 2 June 1996). President Suharto himself encouraged 
workers to focus on ‘national consolidation’ so that they would not be easily influenced by 
incitement from ‘third parties’ who ‘claimed to act for workers’ (Surya 2 June 1996).  
More generally, during the New Order period, non-worker activists were regularly accused of 
having menghasut (incited), memancing (enticed), menggerakkan (mobilized), 
mempengaruhi (influenced), menyusupi (infiltrated) and melakukan intimidasi (intimidated) 
workers in order to make them go on strike. They had done this, officials argued, because 
they saw workers as alat politik (political tools) or komoditi politik (political commodities) to 
further their own political interests. In their attempts to do so, these outsiders were accused of 
having memakai, menggunakan, memperalat and memanfaatkan (used), mengeksploitasi 
(exploited), memanipulasikan (manipulated) or menunggangi (ridden) the workers they 
claimed to be helping to act collectively in response to exploitation by their employers or 
oppression by the state.  
These accusations were used to justify the use of what was known as the ‘security approach’ 
to industrial relations (Hadiz 1997, Ford 1999). In its role as the guardian of national stability 
and industrial peace, the government encouraged bureaucrats, along with functionaries from 
the New Order’s political vehicle, Golkar, and decommissioned military personnel to ‘assist’ 
in the development of industrial relations procedures and institutions. Military intervention 
reached unparalleled heights in the early- to mid-1980s when Admiral Sudomo was head of 
the Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order and later Minister for 
Manpower. Evidence collected during this period suggested it was common for employers to 
go to the military for a quick-fix solution rather than persevering with the official system 
(INDOC 1983, 1984, 1985). Although subsequent Ministers for Manpower attempted to 
dispel the hard-line image of military involvement in industrial relations, Kammen’s (1997: 
191) analysis showed that up to 68% of strikes were subject to military intervention in some 
locations in the early 1990s.10 
The kinds of cultural explanations used to explain worker unrest in this pivotal period have 
been countered by two overlapping but distinct structural explanations of the patterns of 
industrial relations in the New Order. The first, exemplified by the work of Hadiz (1997), 
calls on neo-Marxist theories about the emergence of working-class consciousness as a 
consequence of the process of proletarianization that took place within Indonesia’s increasing 
commitment to a neoliberal model of export-oriented industrialization. The second, 
exemplified by the work of Kammen (1997), points to the failure of Indonesia’s industrial 
relations mechanisms to accommodate (or contain) workers’ demands. Reflecting on the 
wave of strikes in the 1990s, Kammen (1997: 30) noted the New Order’s decision to maintain 
‘older political apparatuses (the structures established at the beginning of the New Order)’ in 
new export-oriented industries – a decision that ‘created a disjunction between the economic 
and the political’, the costs of which were ‘passed on to and borne by labor’. Reflecting more 
specifically on the relatively high incidence of industrial violence in the mid to late 1980s, 
Kammen (1997: 316) argued large-scale violence occurred ‘[i]n the absence of formal 
procedures through which to express and forward grievances and without the legal 
recognition of the right to strike’, citing as evidence for this thesis the fact that the use of 
violence during industrial strikes steadily declined after the right to strike was reinstated in 
August 1990 (Kammen 1997: 318-326).11 
As Kammen suggested, industrial relations practice during the New Order was characterized 
by deep contradictions. The regime made extensive use of informal policies, as well as of 
rules and regulations issued from the ministerial level down, to circumvent pro-worker 
legislation. In 1993, for example, the Director-General of Industrial Relations and Labour 
Standards issued a controversial regulation which gave employers, in consultation with the 
Department, the right to retrench striking workers despite the fact that it contravened legal 
provisions on retrenchment and disputes resolution. Similarly, although the industrial 
relations system included provisions for collective labour agreements and bipartite 
cooperative bodies, as well as a range of tripartite institutions, these mechanisms had little 
relevance in the day-to-day conduct of labour relations (Ford 2000).  
Along with restrictions on freedom of association, these mechanisms were the target for the 
massive restructuring of the industrial relations system that took place after Suharto’s 
resignation in May 1998. One of the very first things his successor Habibie did was to ratify 
ILO Convention No.87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, in doing so effectively abandoning the New Order’s rhetorical and policy 
commitments to a single union. This was followed by a suite of changes to the legal 
architecture of the industrial relations system, which saw the ratification of four more ILO 
conventions and the passage of three major new laws between 1999 and 2004.12 The first of 
the laws to be passed was Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions, under which as few as ten 
workers could form a union and multiple unions were permitted to operate in a single 
workplace. The provisions of the law were much less prescriptive than earlier regulations, 
permitting workers to organize not only on a sectoral basis but also according to occupation 
or on any other basis. The second element of the package was Manpower Law No. 13/2003, 
which covered a wide range of issues, including industrial relations but also labour force 
planning, vocational training, the regulation of foreigners working in Indonesia and wage-
setting. While maintaining a seven-day notification clause and outlawing strikes before 
negotiation processes were exhausted, Law No. 13/2003 embodied a relatively strongly-
worded commitment to the right to strike.  
Law No.13/2003 also foreshadowed changes in dispute-resolution procedures under Law No. 
2/2004 on Industrial Disputes Settlement, which abolished the central and regional dispute 
resolution committees that had sat at the centre of the New Order’s tripartite disputes 
resolution process. Under the 2004 law, there is a renewed emphasis on bipartite negotiations 
at the firm level. If bipartite negotiations fail, disputing parties are offered arbitration or 
conciliation services which, if refused, trigger a mechanism through which the dispute is 
taken to formal mediation. If all of these processes fail, either party has the right to take the 
dispute to the newly convened industrial court, presided over by a local magistrate and two 
ad hoc judges, one nominated by employers and the other nominated by the trade unions.13  
The other major change that took place in Indonesia’s industrial relations system in the post-
Suharto period was the devolution of industrial relations functions, along with a whole range 
of other responsibilities, to the local level. Under Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy, 
minimum wage determination and a range of other industrial relations functions became the 
responsibility of local parliaments and provincial, city or district administrations. These 
changes have moved the locus of the majority of industrial relations processes from the 
national to local level, greatly empowering local union branches, while at the same time 
presenting them with new challenges in terms of the range and complexity of tasks demanded 
of them. In addition, decentralization has increased the importance of local government 
agencies, alongside employers, not only as interlocutors, but also as targets of localized 
industrial protest. The growing importance of the local scale has been enormously significant 
in reshaping the landscape of industrial conflict from one dominated by spontaneous factory-
level events to one characterized by broader regional campaigns, often targeted at least in part 
at local bureaucrats and politicians, as evident in the protests described below.   
Violent protest in Batam 
The island of Batam, in Riau Islands Province, lies in the Straits of Malacca to the north-east 
of Sumatra and directly south of Singapore. Formerly a heavily forested, sparsely populated 
no-man’s-land, Batam was transformed in the 1980s and 1990s into a bustling industrial 
enclave. Although not the first attempt to establish economic cooperation between Singapore 
and Indonesia on Batam, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) 
constituted the pivotal advance in the island’s industrial development. An initiative of the 
Singaporean government in response to the rising cost of local labour and the movement of 
multi-nationals out of Singapore into more cost-efficient manufacturing sites in other parts of 
Asia (Lee 1991), the underpinning philosophy of the IMS-GT was one of economic 
complementarity, in which Singaporean capital and Indonesian and Malaysian labour and 
land would be combined to facilitate cross-border regional growth (Sparke et al. 2004). 
Under the agreement, the Indonesian government relaxed minimum capital investment 
requirements; allowed 100% foreign ownership, subject to the divestment of 5% to local 
ownership after 5 years; and agreed to calculate duty payments on the value of imported raw 
materials rather than on finished products made in Batam (Peachey et al. 1998: 14). 
Batam began to attract high levels of foreign investment under the IMS-GT initiative, 
experiencing a fifteen-fold increase in annual private investment in the five years up to 1993 
(Peachey et al. 1998: 1). Although the IMS-GT was marred by numerous setbacks – most 
notably, the economic and political uncertainty following the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-
1998), which prompted many multi-national investors to downscale the level of their 
investment – Batam continues to be one of Indonesia’s most important centres of industrial 
production.14 The island is now home to 26 industrial parks, including the flagship 
BatamIndo Industrial Park at Muka Kuning and the shipyards at Tanjung Uncang. These 
industrial parks are host to 4,000 local and multinational firms, which exported an average of 
USD 5.73 billion worth of products per annum from 2005 to 2009 (Badan Pengusahaan 
Batam 2011). 
As a consequence of Batam’s industrial development, large numbers of migrants have moved 
to the island from elsewhere in Indonesia seeking work (Grundy-Warr et al. 1999; Bunnell et 
al. 2006). In the early 1970s, Batam’s population was approximately 6,000, increasing to 
105,820 by 1990, the year in which the IMS-GT was formally established. By the end of 
2004, it had reached 633,944 (Lyons and Ford 2007). The 2010 census indicates that by that 
year the population of Batam had risen to 944,285 (Badan Pusat Statistik Kepulauan Riau 
2012b). Of a total workforce of just under 449,000, some 186,000 are employed in 
manufacturing (Badan Pusat Statistik Kepulauan Riau 2012a) in a community that enjoys one 
of the highest percentages of formal sector employment in Indonesia. In terms of the 
proletarianization thesis, Batam is thus a prime site for the emergence of a local labour 
movement, not only because so many workers are in formal sector occupations but also 
because so many of them are new migrants, who live in factory dormitories or in densely 
populated worker communities close to the factories.    
In the absence of the kind of close study conducted by Kammen in the 1990s, it is impossible 
to quantify the number of strikes that occur in Batam – or anywhere else in Indonesia for that 
matter – much less the percentage of them that have involved violence.15 However, along 
with Bekasi and Tangerang in the Greater Jakarta area, it is clear that Batam is a prominent 
site of industrial unrest, a significant proportion of which has involves some level of violence. 
What follows are accounts of two key incidences of industrial violence in recent years: the 
2010 shipyard riots and the 2011 minimum wage campaign.16 
The 2010 shipyard riots 
On 22 April 2010, thousands of shipyard workers ‘ran amok’ in the Drydocks World Graha 
(DWG) complex in Tanjung Uncang Industrial Park. Drydock World Graha, which is run by 
PT Graha Trisakti Industri, is one of three yards owned by Dubai-based investor, Drydocks 
World, all of which are situated at Tanjung Uncang, which is located on the north-western 
coast of Batam.17 The chaos was triggered when Ghesa Prabaharan, a 27-year-old Indian 
expatriate working at DWG, told workers that Indonesians were stupid. News of this 
statement quickly spread through the 8,000-odd local workers employed in the shipyard and, 
through them, to workers elsewhere in Batam, who took to the streets shortly after, protesting 
in solidarity with the DWG workers. The protesters tracked down the expatriate supervisor in 
the company complex, in the process clashing with security guards. The spontaneous rally 
became violent, and within a very short time the angry workers had destroyed or burnt two 
offices and another building, damaging some 27 cars, including six that were totally burnt 
out. The demonstrators subsequently gathered near the entrance gate and continued their 
protest. Total losses were estimated at trillions of rupiah. There were no deaths but a number 
of Indian expatriates and local workers were hospitalized. Around 400 police officers rushed 
to the scene, where they evacuated foreign employees and attempted to quell the riot. Other 
expatriate workers fled to Singapore. 
The incident sparked a flurry of activity. Prabaharan was apprehended and detained. The 
Chief Executive Officer of Drydocks World South East Asia met with several local officials 
including the Deputy Mayor, the Police Commander and the chair of the Batam Free Trade 
Zone Authority. The Ministry for Manpower and Transmigration dispatched a negotiating 
team almost immediately, and within days of the riot, the Indonesian Employers Association 
(Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia, APINDO) had sent a letter to its 13,000 members stating that 
PT Drydocks World had been fault because it had discriminated against local workers and 
cautioning its members of the potential risks of engaging in discriminatory practices. A local 
Indian community leader made a public apology for the incident, as did the Indian Consul 
General in Medan, both of whom worked closely with local authorities to minimize the 
damage to community relations. Initial statements were made by a police spokesperson that 
Prabaharan could face up to four years in jail. However, although some, including members 
of local parliament, agitated for an extended criminal investigation, ultimately an out-of-court 
settlement was reached. 
This was certainly not the first time that expatriate managers had come under fire. In the early 
1990s, there was a spate of strikes protesting against abusive or disrespectful actions by 
Taiwanese and South Korean expatriates in the greater Jakarta area (Kammen 1997: 160).18 
On one occasion in Bekasi, a strike broke out after workers were repeatedly beaten by their 
Korean manager, who had also – according to the workers – forced them to work excessive 
over-time and ‘farted at them’ (an Indonesian expression describing the actions of someone 
who fails to show respect). Similarly, although the DWG riots were the most dramatic, they 
are not the only case of violent rioting in Batam in response to a perceived personal slight. 
Another incident of industrial violence involving shipyard workers occurred in September 
2011 at PT Nexus Engineering Indonesia, located on the other side of the island in the Kabil 
industrial estate. The riot was triggered by a security guard who beat a worker for wrongly 
parking his motorcycle. Hundreds of subcontracting workers went on a rampage after the 
incident, severely damaging the shipyard’s facilities.   
Violence in the 2011 wage campaign 
Another major incident of industrial violence occurred in Batam in November 2011, this time 
over the annual determination of the local minimum wage. On 23 November, electronics 
factories in the industrial parks of Batam became ghost towns, with members of the major 
electronics unions choosing not to turn up to work. While many simply stayed away, around 
30,000 workers gathered in a park and marched to the office of Batam Mayor in a protest 
organized by the Confederation of All Indonesian Worker Unions (Konfederasi Serikat 
Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, KSPSI), the Federation of Indonesian Metalworkers Unions 
(Federasi Serikat Pekerja Metal Indonesia, FSPMI) and the Confederation of Indonesian 
Prosperous Labour Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, KSBSI). Many 
shops closed their doors, fearful of violence. The march resulted in gridlock, leaving Batam 
City paralysed. The protesters planned to meet Batam Mayor, Ahmad Dahlan, to complain 
about the unrealistic level at which the cost of living index – the tool used to determine the 
regional minimum wage – had been set for 2012. According to workers, it cost at least IDR 
1.76 million (USD 185) per month to live in the city. The proposed minimum wage was IDR 
1.28 million (USD 135) per month, a figure just below the government-calculated monthly 
cost of living of IDR 1.3 million (USD 137). Upon arrival the protesters discovered that 
Dahlan had fled to Singapore to avoid confrontation. The rally ended in chaos when the 
protesters clashed with police and damaged a number of properties located around the 
Mayor’s office. One worker was shot by police attempting to contain the riot. 
Having failed to meet the Mayor the previous day, thousands of workers again gathered at his 
office on 24 November. With backup from the police unit of the civil service (Satpol PP), 
police officers attempted to prevent the workers from forcing entry into the Mayor’s office. 
Tensions rose, and the police and the protesters engaged in throwing stones at one another. 
Warning shots were fired, and protesters set a Satpol PP post alight. In an attempt to bring the 
temperature down, Vice Governor Surya Respationo and Chief of Regional Police Raden 
Winarso met the angry workers and arranged a meeting between worker representatives and 
Mayor Dahlan. After a long, exhausting process of negotiations, the Mayor agreed to send a 
letter to the Governor of Riau Islands Province recommending that the minimum wage be set 
at the official cost of living index figure of IDR 1.3 million. Thousands of disappointed 
workers rejected the recommendation, demanding that the minimum wage be set at the real 
cost of living. With the meeting in deadlock, the police attempted to disperse the mass of 
protesters who were still occupying the Mayor’s Office. Clashes erupted again when security 
officers damaged motorcycles belonging to some of the protesters, this time spreading 
throughout the city. Police posts and public property were damaged or destroyed and twelve 
people injured. 
Some blamed the Mayor for not responding to the workers’ demands while unions had 
threatened to strike several days earlier if their demands were not met. The situation was 
exacerbated when the Mayor fled to Singapore rather than facing the protesters on the first 
day of the rally. According to Saiful Badri, the chair of KSPSI’s Batam branch, if the Mayor 
had handled the case swiftly, the riot would not have occurred. Others blamed APINDO. 
There has been a history of conflict over the wage-setting in Batam, but the unions and 
APINDO had reached an agreement the previous year, which unions felt APINDO had not 
honoured in the latest round of negotiations. Before the protest, bipartite meetings had ended 
in deadlock on eight separate occasions.  
As in the case of the shipyard riots, the violence surrounding the 2011 minimum wage 
determination process was certainly not an isolated incident. Similar clashes are common in 
areas of industrial concentration across Indonesia, and violence, albeit on a lesser scale, has 
occurred on other occasions during the minimum wage negotiation period in Batam. Where it 
differed from the 2010 shipyard riots was that, in contrast to the earlier incident, which was 
sparked by a perceived personal slight, the trigger for the 2011 riot lay clearly in an interests 
dispute involving several unions, along with employers and local authorities – and, more 
particularly, in a perception of bad faith on the part of both employers and local authorities.    
From cultural explanations to structural roots 
On the surface, these two cases of industrial violence appear to have stemmed from very 
different causes. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear they had very similar roots. 
Although a racial slur was the trigger for 2010 shipyard protest, that slur was effectively the 
straw that broke the camel’s back, coming on the back of accumulated pressure on local 
workers as a result of poor enforcement of labour regulations, particularly as they pertain to 
the practice of outsourcing and almost non-existent inspection regimes. According to the 
president of FSPMI, the massive use of outsourcing workers was the real issue behind the 
industrial unrest in April 2010. The union estimated that, at the time of the riot, up to 97% of 
Drydocks World Graha workers were indirectly employed on salaries of just IDR 900,000 
(USD 95), with no health insurance and no pension allocation. This type of employment is 
not unique to DWG. All of the 60-odd shipyards in Batam employ the bulk of their local 
workforce on a short-term contract basis through subcontractors under far less favourable 
conditions than their permanent local employees, who in turn earn much less than their 
expatriate counterparts. Moreover, in the lead-up to the riot, one subcontractor had failed to 
pay workers’ wages for a period of three months on the grounds that the shipyards had not 
yet transferred the funds. When workers demanded payment directly from the shipyards on 
the urging of the subcontractor, they were told that they had to deal with the subcontracting 
firm because the shipyards had no direct responsibility for the payment of their wages. 
Another issue raised by workers was the issue of paid overtime. According to them, the vast 
majority of shipyard companies do not pay for overtime in contravention with Ministerial 
Decision No. 102/2004 concerning Overtime and Overtime Wages, which stipulates that time 
worked beyond regular working hours should be recompensed. Moreover, workers 
complained that there were no written overtime agreements between the company and its 
employees, as stipulated by 2003 Manpower Law. In addition, DWG and many other 
shipyards discourage workers from establishing trade unions. Workers attempting to assert 
their collective rights are further confounded by the complex relationship between contract 
workers, their subcontracting firm, and the shipyards itself. The Minister for Manpower later 
acknowledged that outsourcing was, indeed, a factor in the 2010 shipyard riots (Kompas 21 
May 2010). However, more generally – as in the New Order period – attempts were made by 
officials and military officers to shift attention from structural issues. The National Police 
Chief General was quoted as saying that the conflict was ‘purely internal’, and ‘merely 
caused by insulting language’, a message reinforced by the Coordinating Minister for 
Economic Affairs, Hatta Rajasa, who described the riot as an ‘internal incident’ and ‘not a 
problem caused by a regulation’ (Antara News Service 23 April 2010). It appears, then, that 
cultural explanations for violent industrial protest are alive and well in Indonesia. 
Cultural proclivity, proletarian consciousness or institutional problem? 
If, as Kammen (1997) claims, violent industrial protest is a consequence of the failure of 
industrial relations mechanisms to accommodate changes in Indonesia’s industrial relations 
landscape and not a product of Indonesians’ cultural proclivities, there are a number of 
reasons to think that the incidence of industrial violence should have declined rapidly, if not 
completely disappeared, in the post-Suharto period. Not only has independent unionism been 
reinstated, but industrial relations processes have been restructured to include a much greater 
emphasis on collective bargaining and mechanisms for disputes resolution at the firm level, 
as well as more inclusive higher-level disputes resolution processes. Why, then, do large-
scale incidents of industrial violence, such as those described here, continue to occur? Are 
industrial relations scholars too quick to dismiss the cultural explanations advanced by 
Indonesian officials and some anthropologists? Or is the persistence of violent industrial 
protest an example of entrenched repertoires of action (Boudreau 2004), where workers 
continue to engage in established modes of practice because of their familiarity rather than 
their effectiveness?  
There is some element of truth in the culturalist explanations insofar as they give insight into 
the ways in which the dynamics of particular incidents unfold – although perhaps less as a 
form of ‘innate’ cultural expression than in the sense of reflecting entrenched repertoires of 
action, which have evolved not only as a result of social and political constraints on freedom 
of expression during the New Order but also more specifically within blue-collar formal-
sector workplaces and worker communities during and after that time. As the 
proletarianization thesis suggests, these repertoires of action emerge (at least in part) from the 
experience of industrial labour and the opportunities and challenges that it presents. In the 
Batam case, this experience is heightened by a very high level of foreign ownership – which, 
while in itself is often an indicator of better industrial relations practice, in the Indonesian 
context brings increasing complexity as a result of the expatriate presence, which sharpens 
workers’ sense of injustice. At the same time, however, there is little evidence – even in an 
industrial centre like Batam – that workers identify primarily in class terms.  
More important is the fact that spontaneous protest, including its more violent manifestations, 
remains a key weapon in a context where formal structures continue to fail to accommodate 
workers’ demands. Despite dramatic changes in the industrial relations landscape since the 
fall of the New Order – which have undoubtedly improved the mechanisms through which 
workers’ interests are represented – Indonesia’s industrial relations system remains riven with 
inconsistencies and ongoing problems with implementation both within the workplace and at 
higher levels. In such a situation, violent protests are likely to continue so long as the formal 
industrial relations system is perceived by workers to be unable to channel their demands. 
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Notes 
 
1 The research on which this chapter is based is part of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project 
entitled ‘The Re-emergence of Political Labour in Indonesia’ (DP120100654).  
2 For example, see Welsh (2008) for a detailed discussion of a non-communal form of mob violence called 
keroyokan (ripping someone apart) and its catalysts and Colombijn (2002) for an historical perspective on 
contemporary collective violence. 
3 It is important to note that some close empirical studies of violent conflicts suggest that collective violence is 
not as widespread as it seems (Collins 2002, Varshney et al. 2008). 
4 In one case cited by Kammen (1997: 316), workers in Sidoarjo threatened to use black magic on a Taiwanese 
personnel manager if she was not replaced. 
5 For comparison, see Teitelbaum (2010: 694) for statistics on violent protest in South Asia and Pun Ngai and 
Hulin Lu (2010) on the use of violence by sub-contractors in post-socialist China. 
6 As Saptari (2008: 7) noted there is a very limited literature on Indonesian labour movement and labour protest 
in Indonesia. Indeed, Saptari’s account of the 1999 strike at PT Mayora, a biscuit and confectionary company, is 
one of the few in-depth academic accounts of individual strikes available for the post-New Order period. 
Another less detailed account of a post-New Order strike is provided in Ford (2009: 1-3). Kammen (1997) 
describes a number of strikes that occurred in the 1990s in depth. For a detailed account of strikes in the late 
colonial period, see Ingleson (1981, 1986) 
7 Ong’s account and similar arguments made about young factory workers in Indonesia are just some of several 
reports of mass hysteria among young female factory workers in the 1970s and 1980s (Smyth and Grijns 1997: 
15). For a very different account of young women’s acculturation to the industrial workforce in Indonesia, see 
Warouw (2008). 
8 The discussion that follows on the threat of outsiders draws heavily on Ford (2009: 77-80). See also Ford 
(2010). 
9 Accusations about other kinds of ‘outside influence’ were made in the wake of the riots, with some observers 
claiming that the military had intervened to exacerbate the protests and to shift their focus to the Chinese 
community. 
10 Kammen also identified some cases in this period in which military officers supported striking workers. For a 
discussion of the use of community figures to discipline workers, see Warouw (2006). 
11 After this time, violent incidents were most common in large establishments, most often in textiles, footwear 
and timber. Over half of all strikes in the early 1990s occurred in the textile garment and footwear industries and 
other forms of light manufacturing – a dramatic change from the situation in the early 1980s, when strike 
intensity was highest in heavy industry, and particularly in the metal and chemical industries (Kammen 1997: 
148-40). 
12 For a detailed discussion of the politics of the early stages of this reform, see Caraway (2004). 
13 These ad hoc judges serve a five-year term, are required to hold a Bachelor’s Degree (in any field) and must 
have at least five years experience in the field of industrial relations. The new industrial court system has seen a 
rapid professionalisation of legal advocacy within the trade union movement, with many union officials 
undertaking law degrees so that the unions are not forced to rely on external representation. 
14  In 2006, in an effort to re-invigorate the economies of the islands, Singapore and Indonesia announced the 
creation of Special Economic Zones in Batam, Bintan and Karimun (the BBK SEZ). The SEZ Framework 
Agreement on Economic Cooperation outlines seven key areas that Indonesia and Singapore will cooperate in to 
ensure that business, regulatory and labour conditions in the islands are favourable to investors. 
15 Some statistics are available on the website of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration. However, they 
are wildly inaccurate. For example, in 2010, the year in which the shipyard riots occurred, the statistics indicate 
that there were no demonstrations or strikes in Kepulauan Riau Province. 
16 The accounts of the two incidents provided here were compiled from interviews with trade unionists and 
newspaper reports. 
17 The other two companies are Drydock World Pertama and Drydock World Nanindah (also known as PT. Nan 
Indah Mutiara Shipyard). See http://www.drydocks.gov.ae. 
                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
18 Interviews I conducted with workers in Bekasi and Tangerang in the late 1990s and early 2000s confirmed 
that there was indeed a hierarchy of preference when it came to employers, with the Europeans on top, followed 
by the Americans, the Japanese and the Singaporeans, with the South Koreans and Taiwanese very much at the 
bottom. Trade unionists interviewed in Batam in 2007 confirmed that a similar hierarchy exists in Batam. 
